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INTRODUCTION  to  the  GENETIC 
TREATMENT  of  the  FAITH- 
CONSCIOUSNESS  in  the 
INDIVIDUAL 


BY 

WILLIAM  WILBERFORCE  COSTIN 


A  DISSERTATION 

Submitted  to  the   Board  of   University    Studies  of  the  Johns   Hopkins 

University  in  conformity  with  the  requirements  for  the 

Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


WILLIAMS  &  WILKINS  COMPANY 

BALTIMORE 

1909 


INTRODUCTION  to  the  GENETIC 
TREATMENT  of   the  FAITH- 
CONSCIOUSNESS  in  the 
INDIVIDUAL 


BY 

WILLIAM  WILBERFORCE  COSTIN 


A  DISSERTATION 

Submitted  to  the   Board  of   University    Studies  of  the  Johns   Hopkins 

University  in  conformity  with  the  requirements  for  the 

Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


ERSlTV 

or 


WILLIAMS  &  WILKINS  COMPANY 

BALTIMORE 

1909 


Oj 


Copyright,  1909 

BY 

William  Wilberforce  Costin 


PART  I 
NON-RELIGIOUS  FAITH 


Prefatory  Note. 

The  object  of  this  dissertation  is  to  carry  into  a  new  field, 
that  of  the  reUgious;  the  method  of  approach  known  as  the 
"Genetic  Method,"  which  has  become  so  fruitful  in  the  hands  of 
contemporary  psychologists  and  logicians. 

w.  w.  c. 


18e^-^B 


CONTENTS. 
Part  I. 

NON-RELIGIOUS  FAITH. 

Chapter     I     Genesis  of  the  Faith  Consciousness  or  Pre- 

Logical Faith:  Presumption 7-13 

Chapter  II  Practical  or  Quasi-Logical  Faith:  Assump- 
tion       14-18 

Chapter  III    Rational  or  Logical  Faith:  Presupposition 

and  Belief 19-21 

Chapter  IV     Ideal  Faith:  Postulation 22-31 

Chapter  V  Mystic  and  Hyper-Logical  Faith.  I  Mys- 
tic Faith:  Contemplation.  II  Hyper- 
Logical  Faith:  The  Hyper  -  Logical 
Experience  as  Union  of  Faith  and 
Knowledge 32-43 

Part  II. 

religious  faith. 

Appendix  I    (presenting  a  brief  abstract  of  Part  II.)  . ..     44-45 

Part  III. 

the  faith  principle  in  modern  philosophy. 

(Omitted.) 

Life 46-47 


V  OF 


Part  I 

NON-RELIGIOUS  FAITH 

CHAPTER  I 

GENESIS    OF   THE    FAITH-CONSCIOUSNESS 

OR 

PRE-LOGICAL  FAITH!   PRESUMPTION 

By  the  faith-consciousness*  is  meant  the  conscious  act  and  con- 
tent of  faith.  The  act  of  faith  is  consciousness  functioning 
according  to  the  demand  of  the  faith-stimulus.  Faith  as  act  is 
that  condition  in  which  mental  objects  possess  the  interest  and 
significance  that  make  them  worthy  of  acknowledgment,  con- 
sideration and  trust.  Faith  as  content  from  the  psychological 
point  of  view  comprises  those  activities  and  mental  states  result- 
ing from  the  above  condition  over  against  which  consciousness 
sets  itself. 

Our  first  interest  is  not  so  much  in  the  functioning  of  the  faith- 
consciousness  as  in  the  consideration  of  what  constitutes  the 
content  and  genesis  of  the  same.  We  pass  to  that  considera- 
tion. 

There  can  be  no  adequate  psychological  study  of  the  faith 
principle  without  raising  the  question  of  its  genesis.  Where  in 
the  psychic  movement  does  there  appear  anything  resembling 
that  which  in  mature  consciousness  we  call  faith?  In  attempt- 
ing to  answer  this  question  we  shall  seek  by  comparative  analysis 
of  the  various  functions  of  the  primary  consciousness  to  set  in 
bold  relief  a  psychic  process  or  principle  which  would  seem  funda- 
mentally to  resemble  the  psychological  principle  of  mature  faith. 
In  making  this  analysis  we  begin  with  the  cognitive  function. 

'  For  a  study  of  the  natxire  of  consciousness,  see  Baldwin,  Handbook  of 
Psy.     Senses  and  Intellect,  pp.  43-45. 


8  The  Faith  Consciousness 

Mere  reaction  against  external  action  is  not  an  adequate  de- 
scription of  the  cognitive  process.  A  mere  hitting-back  move- 
ment could  never  produce  meaning.  A  reaction,  to  have  cog- 
nitive value,  must  be  that  of  an  inner  movement  or  control  which 
gives  it  direction,  and  for  which  the  result  is  meaning.  Such  a 
control  would  indicate  a  cognitive  consciousness.  Cognition, 
then,  is  that  activity  in  the  psychic  process  which  accepts  and 
unifies  the  impression  made  by  stimulation,  and  constructs  it 
into  meaning,  thereby  constituting  it  knowledge  for  the  reacting 
consciousness.  Thus  we  are  able  to  distinguish  between  cog- 
nitive process  and  cognitive  content  or  knowledge.^ 

Feeling:  The  bombardment  of  consciousness  by  external 
action  is  something  first  of  all  felt.  The  feeling  produced  by  such 
an  attack  is  instantly  followed  by  reaction.  And  the  reaction 
process  itself  again  stimulates  feeling.  This  is  true  also  of  the 
presence  of  cognitive  content  or  knowledge  in  consciousness. 
It  produces  an  affection  of  the  self,^  an  affection  which  in  turn  is 
the  index  or  sign  of  at  least  an  emotional  valuation  given  by 
consciousness  to  the  constructs  of  all  conscious  activity. 

Will:  Every  state  of  consciousness  is  the  embodiment  of  a 
mental  process.^  Even  reflex  action  is  the  expression  of  activity. 
There  could  be  no  such  action  without  a  psychic  process.  This 
and  the  other  activities  of  mind  necessary  for  attention,  feeling 
and  knowing,  together  with  the  power  of  conscious  control 
within  limits,*  characterize  will. 

The  process,  the  genesis  of  which  we  are  seeking,  will  gradually 
emerge,  as  we  analyze  and  compare  it  with  the  aspects  of  con- 
sciousness sketched  above.  But  first  let  us  compare  these  activ- 
ities with  each  other  as  to  their  genesis. 

Prof.  Dewey  says,  ''that,  first,  feeling  is  necessary,  for  unless 
the  mind  were  affected  in  some  way  by  the  object  or  the  truth, 

*Bowne,  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge,  p.  9.  "Thought  may- 
signify  the  mental  activity,  and  it  may  signify  the  contents  grasped  through 
that  activity. " 

^  See  Dewey,  Psy.,  p.  16. 

*  Bowne,  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge,  p.  38. 

*  Bowne,  Psy.,  p.  222. 


Pre-Logical  Faith:  Presumption  9 

unless  it  had  some  interest  in  them,  it  would  never  direct  itself 
to  them,  would  not  pay  attention  to  them,  and  they  would  not 
come  within  its  sphere  of  knowledge  at  all."* 

To  apprehend  feeling  is  a  cognitive  act  as  seen  in  the  unifying 
process  which  sets  it  up,  and  recognizes  it  as  such.  Besides,  feel- 
ing for,  or  interest  in,  a  thing,  or  the  truth,  carries  the  attention 
and  results  in  its  cognition.  But  the  attention  involved  a  proc- 
ess of  conation;  so  that  the  relative  position  in  which  these 
three  aspects  of  consciousness  stand  as  respects  dependence 
would  be  feeling,  will,  cognition.  That  is,  taking  the  construc- 
tive act  of  setting  up  feeling  as  cognition. 

We  come  now  to  the  genesis  of  the  faith  principle.  Faith  has 
no  meaning  without  an  object,  so  that  will  and  feeling  must  pre- 
cede the  process.  In  order  better  to  understand  these  conditions 
and  the  resulting  significance  of  the  faith  principle,  let  us  take 
for  illustration,  some  object  of  cognition,  say  the  child  and  its 
bottle.  The  nurse,  with  the  bottle,  appears  and  disappears. 
The  child  sees  the  bottle  for  a  moment  but  is  soon  disappointed. 
What  is  the  psychic  state  of  the  child's  consciousness  until  it 
appears  again? 

Many  elements  enter  in  to  complicate  the  situation.  Cogni- 
tion has  done  its  work  in  constructing  the  object.  As  knowl- 
edge it  is  accompanied  by  a  state  of  feeling,  an  affection  of  self; 
it  comes  to  have  value,  worth,  significance  for  consciousness. 
Interest  is  aroused.^  But  the  object  has  disappeared.  What 
does  the  child  do?  After  a  moment  of  restless  disappointment, 
it  gives  itself  up  to  the  situation,  in  the  spirit  of  blind  surrender 
to  the  object,  to  watch  and  wait  for  its  return.  The  psychic  sig- 
nificance of  the  attitude  thus  assumed  involves  the  problem 
of  the  faith  principle.  We  pass  to  the  consideration  of  that 
significance. 

In  the  pre-logical  mode  consciousness  may  be  characterized  as 
respects  its  attitude  in  its  control  of  a  given  content  as  a  ''pre- 
sumption of  existence,  control,  or  reality;"^  and  over  against 

*  Dewey,  Psy.,  p.  18. 

'  Baldwin,  Handbook  of  Psy.   Feeling  and  Will,  p.  139,  on  Nature  of  Interest. 

3  Baldwin,  Thought  and  Things,  Vol.  II,  p.  11. 


10  The  Faith  Consciousness 

this,  "assumption" — the  contrasted  attitude  towards  what  is 
not  presumed,  but  is  made  "schematic  for  further  determina- 
tion."^ The  psychic  significance  of  the  attitude  of  conscious- 
ness while  waiting  and  watching  for  the  return  of  the  absent  object 
involves  the  principle  of  "presumption,"  i.e.,  consciousness 
"  presumes  its  existence  and  availability  in  the  world  of  its  prac- 
tical interests.  "2  The  attitude  thus  characterized  may  be  called 
"presumptive  faith." 

We  have  seen  that  cognition,  feeling  and  will,  construct,  attend 
and  give  conscious  value  to  the  object.  These  activities  spring 
up  the  moment  the  stimulating  conditions  are  present.  It  is  not 
even  necessary,  in  order  to  arouse  these  activities,  that  the  object 
be  familiar.  A  stimulus  flashed  into  consciousness  for  the  first 
time,  will  stimulate  reaction,  arouse  interest,  and  result  in  cog- 
nition. The  attitude  of  consciousness  toward  an  unfamiliar 
and  persisting  object,  has  in  it  at  least  two  elements  of  the  faith 
principle,  namely.  Interest  and  Surrender. 

Interest  once  aroused  in  the  object  persists  so  long  as  the  object 
persists,  that  is,  if  the  object  has  any  significance  for  conscious- 
ness. But  in  addition  to,  and  along  with,  persisting  interest 
in  a  persisting  object,  we  have  the  attitude  of  consideration  or 
sustained  interest — the  unrefiective  attitude  of  primary  contem- 
plation or  first  immediacy.  The  considering  consciousness  has  in 
it  the  element  of  knomng.  It  persists  in  seeing  progressive, 
enriching,  enlarging,  and  changing  meaning  in  the  object.  This 
attitude  of  concentrated  interest  in  the  object  is  an  attitude  in 
which  consciousness  goes  out,  in  a  process  of  grasping  and  indi- 
viduating the  object  as  a  unit. 

Interest  as  acceptance  is  akin  to  logical  acknowledgment.  It 
is  an  element  in  presumption  (or  reality-feeling).  In  the  pre- 
logical  consciousness  it  is  what  "belief"  is  in  the  logical. 

The  second  element  of  the  faith  principle  is  surrender.  The 
object,  in  yielding  up  its  meaning,  must  arouse  sufficient  interest 
to  make  it  worth  while  for  consciousness  to  concentrate  upon  it. 


'  Ibid.,  p.  11. 
'Ibid.,  p.  12. 


Pre-Logical  Faith:  Presumption  11 

But  this  attitude  when  once  assumed,  involving  the  considering 
consciousness,  includes  in  its  activities  the  process  of  surrender. 

Surrender,  as  here  used,  is  an  act  of  the  will,  but  it  is  something 
more.  It  is  will  not  only  in  the  sense  that  all  conscious  process 
is  will  or  activity,  but  it  is  a  definite  act  of  will.  It  is  an  act, 
however,  which  rests  upon  meaning  as  its  stimulus.  It  is  the 
process  involved  in  consideration;  not  the  process  that  wills  to 
consider,  but  the  process  which  gives  itself  over  under  the  pres- 
sure of  meaning,*  value,  significance,  in  the  thing  considered. 
It  is  a  resting  of  the  entire  self  upon  the  object.  The  thing  be- 
comes fulfillment  or  end-state.  Meaning  becomes  so  trustworthy 
and  significant,  and  seems  to  guarantee  so  much,  that  conscious- 
ness falls  upon  it,  and  confidently  rests  and  reposes  in  it  as 
something  having  value  and  worth  while.  But  all  this  is  in  the 
presence  of  a  persisting  object.  This  is  the  second  element  of 
presumption. 

Take  now  the  case  where  the  object  does  not  persist,  as  that 
of  the  disappearance  of  the  nurse  and  the  bottle.  A  new  situa- 
tion confronts  us,  and  new  elements  manifest  themselves.  With 
a  persisting  object  the  function  of  memory  is  unnecessary,  unless 
we  say  that  continuous  recognition  involves  memory.  But  with 
a  passing  and  shifting  object,  memory  is  indispensable.  There 
could  be  no  recognition  of  the  object,  when  it  reappears,  without 
memory.  And  there  could  be  no  image  formed  of  the  object 
without  it.  So  that  when  the  object  disappears,  consciousness 
is  able  to  reproduce  it  in  memory.  It  is  this  image  object  for 
the  original  of  which  consciousness  with  great  interest  waits  and 
watches. 

The  element  of  "absence"  entering  into  the  situation,  pro- 
duces a  different  state  of  consciousness  from  that  of  the  persist- 
ing object.  If  the  meaning  has  sufficient  significance  to  guaran- 
tee "absent  treatment,"  consciousness,  remembering  and  imag- 
ing the  object  and  feeling  its  worth,  makes,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
persisting  object,  a  surrender  of  itself  to  it  as  imaged,  and  waits 

'  On  rise  of  psychic  meanings;  Baldwin,  Thought  and  Things  or  Genetic 
Logic,  Vol.  I,  p.  130;  a  work  upon  which  many  of  the  psychological  posi- 
tions of  this  paper  are  based. 


12  The  Faith  Consciousness 

patiently  and  intently  for  its  reappearance.  The  act  of  sur- 
render to  an  object,  with  all  that  that  involves  as  compared  with 
the  similar  process  when  the  object  persists,  is  the  further  ele- 
ment of  the  faith  principle.  The  process  here  is  more  than  sim- 
ply will.  The  absence  of  the  object  gives  rise  to  the  "trustful" 
state  of  consciousness.  Trust  is  produced.  Confidence  or 
"trust"  in  the  unseen  object,  impelling  consciousness  to  take 
the  attitude  of  surrender,  of  waiting  and  watching  for  its  return, 
along  with  the  interest  necessary  to  stimulate  the  process,  is  the 
first  mode  of  faith  characterized  by  "presumption." 

In  "trust"  there  are  two  elements  (1)  trust  in  the  conversion 
value  of  the  image,  corresponding  to  the  "interest"  element  in 
faith,  and  (2)  trust  in  the  satisfying  or  worthful  character  of  con- 
tent, corresponding  to  surrender;  so  that  "trust"  shows  the  same 
two  factors  in  the  image  mode.  It  requires  on  the  cognitive  side 
what  Prof.  Baldwin  has  described  as  the  "remote  sameness" 
meaning.^ 

The  faith  principle  takes  its  rise  in  the  lowest  levels  of  con- 
sciousness, as  seen  in  the  fact  that  certain  of  its  elements  appear 
in  advance  of  the  memory  function.  This  is  true  even  on  the 
theory  that  memory  is  involved  in  continuous  recognition.  For 
before  recognition  is  possible,  interest  must  be  aroused,  while 
it  in  turn  is  followed  by  reaction.  But  the  element  of  faith  which 
appears  as  the  result  of  embarrassment  on  the  part  of  conscious- 
ness in  its  endeavor  to  relate  itself  to  the  absent  object,  takes  its 
rise  in  consciousness,  after  the  image  has  been  lifted  from  the 
material  object,  and,  by  memory,  recognized  as  in  some  sense  the 
copy  of  the  same.  The  reposeful,  trustful  state  of  consciousness, 
involving  confidence  in  the  absent  and  unseen,  is  not  possible 
until  consciousness  has  passed  into  the  higher  mode  of  memory. 
But  even  this  is  placing  the  genesis  of  faith  at  a  very  low  level 
in  the  development  of  consciousness. 

Faith  at  this  level  attaches  to  "foreign"  control.^  The  mind 
under  the  pressure  of  meaning  goes  direct  to  the  object,  or,  rather, 


»  Baldwin,  Thought  and  Things,  Vol.  I,  p.  156. 
2  On  the  Notion  of  Control,   Ibid.,  p.  57. 


V 


CAUfO^^'^ 


Pre-Logical  Faith:  Presumption  13 

to  where  it  is  expected  to  reappear.  Everything  in  consciousness 
at  this  stage  is  becoming  external.  If  left  to  itself,  conscious- 
ness instantly  seeks  its  object,  in  order  to  entwine  itself  about  it, 
and  find  satisfaction  in  the  enfoldment.  Consciousness  is  under 
its  control.  The  power  to  constitute  the  object  something  for 
consciousness  in  the  sense  of  setting  it  up  at  will,  for  thought  and 
consideration,  is  not  yet  developed.  Faith  at  this  stage  is  ration- 
ally blind — it  "presumes." 

It  is  to  be  noted,  therefore,  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
this  simple  or  first  consciousness,  which  is  mere  apprehension, 
and  the  consciousness  of  contemplation  or  the  higher  mode  of 
immediacy.  The  contemplative  consciousness  at  this  stage  is, 
not  conscious  that  it  is  contemplating.  It  lacks  the  power  to  set 
up,  as  an  object  of  thought,  this  fact  or  process  and  also  the  com- 
plex content  of  the  logical  mode  for  contemplation.  There  is  no 
consciousness  either  of  a  distinction  between  the  self  which  con- 
templates and  the  object  contemplated.  The  dualism  of  sub- 
ject-object has  not  yet  sprung  up.  There  is  lacking  also  the 
power  of  judgment,  and  the  capacity  for  rational  determination 
within  the  content  of  consciousness.  It  may  be  said  that  con- 
sciousness at  this  level  is  in  the  pre-logical  mode,  lacking  all  the 
powers  that  go  to  make  up  the  logical  function.  The  principle, 
therefore,  the  genesis  of  which  we  are  seeking,  may  be  called 
pre-logical  faith  or  Presumption. 


CHAPTER  II 

PRACTICAL  OR   QUASI-LOGICAL  FAITH:    ASSUMPTION 

The  expression  ''quasi-logical  faith"  may  be  better  understood 
as  we  consider  the  general  movement  of  consciousness  through- 
out this  section  of  its  progressions,  and  note  the  larger  charac- 
teristics of  other  phases.  Consciousness  viewed  from  the  genetic 
standpoint  is  seen  to  be  not  something  static  and  fixed,  but  an 
organized  vital  psychic  process  of  action  and  reaction  against 
stimulus  to  its  own  internal  advantage  developmentally  and 
experimentally.  Consciousness  thought  of  as  thus  growing, 
expanding  and  enriching  itself  takes  to  itself  direction,  and 
makes  for  itself  a  history.  The  study  of  consciousness  through- 
out the  highway  of  its  procession,  and  byway  of  its  history  is  the 
work  of  Genetic  Logic  and  Psychology.  Throughout  this  ever 
expanding  movement  may  be  traced  the  vital  strands  of  its 
being  which  taken  together  constitute  longitudinally  at  least  its 
inner  fiber  and  structure.  A  study  of  the  genesis  of  conscious 
elements  is  first  of  all  an  investigation  as  to  the  source,  rooting 
and  rise  of  the  fibers  constituting  the  strandlike  structure  of 
consciousness. 

In  order  to  clearness  it  is  necessary  to  explain  that  what  we 
are  calling  the  "strands  of  consciounsess "  are  in  turn  for  pur- 
poses of  analysis  thought  of  as  each  constituting  a  separate  mode 
of  consciousness.  Thus  we  may  speak  of  the  moral,  aesthetic, 
cognitive,  religious,  emotional,  volitional  or  faith-consciousness. 
That  is  to  say  when  we  find  consciousness  functioning  habitually 
in  a  particular  way — in  such  a  way  as  can  be  definitely  charac- 
terized and  studied  throughout  the  histoiy  of  that  process  we 
call  it  a  consciousness  of  this  or  that  particular  kind  or  mode. 
Thus  we  find  justification  for  the  use  of  the  term  "  faith-conscious- 
ness. "     It  is  the  study  of  a  mode  of  consciousness  theoretically 


Quasi-Logical  Faith:  Assumption  15 

within  the  whole  of  consciousness  and  yet  not  actually  separable 
from  the  whole;  for  after  all  consciousness  functions  as  a  unit;^  it 
is  the  one  and  the  same  consciousness  functioning  now  as  moral, 
now  as  aesthetic,  now  as  religious,  etc.  The  identity  is  not  in  the 
process  but  in  the  quality  characteristic  of  each  process.  For 
example  when  consciousness  in  its  functioning  has  the  quality 
or  character  of  faith  we  call  it  a  faith-consciousness;  when  it  has 
the  quality  of  cognition  we  call  it  a  cognitive  consciousness. 

When  the  particular  consciousness  which  we  are  analyzing 
out  has  made  a  beginning  and  a  history  for  itself  through  growth, 
we  call  with  Baldwin  the  distance  covered  in  its  development  a 
progression;  and  this  taken  together  with  its  beginning  as  a  gen- 
esis may  be  designated  in  its  entirety  as  a  genetic  progression. 
Still  further  by  way  of  definition  it  may  be  said  that  when  in  any 
progression  we  come  to  a  point  where  a  new  character  appears 
and  thereafter  a  new  and  distinctive  quality  is  given  to  conscious- 
ness that  the  section  of  the  progression  thus  formed  is  a  mode  and 
that  the  transition  made  from  what  went  before  into  the  new 
character  is  a  modal  transition  or  genesis.^  In  the  genetic  treat- 
ment of  the  strands  of  consciousness  it  is  usually  found  that  the 
conscious  fibers  of  one  mode  have  their  roots  in  the  preceding 
mode,  or  even  run  back  through  all  preceding  modes  into  the 
foundation  soil  of  consciousness  itself.  Minor  growths  or  enlarge- 
ments within  the  mode  may  be  called  ''progressions." 

Above  we  suggested  that  a  glance  at  some  other  phase  of  con- 
sciousness might  be  of  help  in  understanding  the  meaning  of  the 
mode  into  which  the  faith-consciousness  has  now  passed.  Take 
for  example  the  cognitive  consciousness  considered  from  the  side 
of  logical  meaning.  There  would  first  of  all  be  the  pre-logical 
mode;  that  phase  of  the  cognitive  consciousness  apparently 
destitute  of  logical  meaning  although  the  roots  of  the  logical 
might  be  present.  The  objects  cognized  by  consciousness  in  this 
state  could  only  be  those  of  sense  and  memory.     From  the  pre- 

'  See  Bowne,  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge,  p.  22. 

^  See  Baldwin,  Development  and  Evolution,  Chap.  XIX,  "The  Theory 
of  Genetic  Modes;"  also  Thought  and  Things,  Vol.  I,  for  the  positions 
immediately  following. 


16  The  Faith  Consciousness 

logical  the  passage  is  made  into  the  quasi-logical  mode.  Here 
the  objects  cognized  are  those  of  fancy,  make-believe,  and  sub- 
stantive objects.  In  order  to  clearness  as  to  what  is  meant  by 
the  quasi-logical  mode  of  the  cognitive  consciousness  let  us  take 
one  of  these  objects  of  determination  and  analyze  it  in  its  rela- 
tions both  from  beneath  and  from  above,  from  the  logical  as  well 
as  from  the  pre-logical  point  of  view.  Take  for  example  the 
make-believe  determination  as  set  forth  in  play.  Here  we  have 
a  construction  of  the  imagination  aided  by  memory  of  a  situation 
which  in  part  is  suggested  by  real  life — herein  imitative — but 
at  the  same  time  is  consciously  unreal. 

While  the  play  situation  is  consciously  recognized  as  unreal 
it  may  be  said  to  be  under  psychic  control,  and  to  be  psychically 
or  inwardly  determined.  But  so  soon  as  the  play  is  fairly  under 
way  and  consciousness  looses  itself  in  the  spirit  of  the  game  the 
situation  for  the  time  seems  real  and  all  psychic  control  is  with- 
drawn. But  now  and  then  in  the  midst  of  the  excitement  the 
player  realizes  that  after  all  it  is  only  play,  and  yields  to  it  as  a 
"conscious  self-illusion."  In  this  we  see  what  is  called  in  the 
cognitive  consciousness  the  quasi-logical  mode.  Here  is  the 
element  of  the  pre-logical,  where  all  logical  determination  is 
withdrawn,  and  at  the  same  time  the  logical,  where  conscious 
content  is  more  or  less  under  the  control  peculiar  to  the  self. 
With  this  process  in  mind  we  are  better  able  to  understand  the 
meaning  of  the  quasi-logical  mode  of  the  faith-consciousness. 
We  pass  to  the  further  consideration  of  that  mode. 

The  tendency  of  consciousness,  observed  from  the  beginning 
to  go  direct  to  its  object  is  maintained  throughout  the  life  of  the 
individual.  It  is  only  after  persistent  endeavor  and  laborious 
lifting  of  thought  from  its  object  that  consciousness  comes  to 
realize  its  right  and  power  to  push  and  hold  off  from  itself  for 
purposes  of  thought  and  consideration  its  various  mental  con- 
structs. These  two  roads  indicating  the  direction  and  move- 
ment of  consciousness  in  its  development  branch  from  a  com- 
mon point  located  in  the  lower  levels  of  psychic  progression. 
Within  these  overlapping  spheres  of  conscious  content  are  to  be 
found  certain  forms  of  the  faith  principle.     The  first  of  which 


Quasi-Logical  Faith:  Assumption  17 

may  be  considered  under  the  head  of  "practical  faith."  By 
this  we  mean  that  principle  which  enables  the  individual  to  so 
relate  himself  to  things  and  persons  and  to  the  constituted  order 
of  his  environment  as  to  guarantee  the  ongoing  of  his  life  with  as 
little  friction  and  embarrassment  as  possible.  In  order  to  fix 
with  any  degree  of  certainty  the  content  and  setting  of  this  prin- 
ciple other  related  topics  should  have  due  consideration.  We 
pass  to  the  determination  of  these  considerations  and  principles 
in  their  relation  to  faith. 

Impulse:^  An  impulse  is  the  onward  pressure  of  ideas,  feelings 
or  perceptions  as  states  of  consciousness  showing  itself  in  activ- 
ity, as  in  producing  some  external  physical  change.  An  instinc- 
tive impulse  is  the  feeling  on  the  part  of  consciousness  of  being 
impelled  to  act  without  knowing  the  end  to  be  realized  yet  with 
the  power  to  select  the  proper  means  for  its  accomplishment.' 
While  impulse  is  not  faith  it  is  so  closely  related  to  it  in  this  mode 
as  to  supply  the  dynamic  of  the  principle  in  its  practical  use. 
It  often  compels  the  exercise  of  faith  as  when  one  trusts  another 
or  some  situation  on  no  other  ground  than  that  of  instinctive 
impulse.  Much  of  the  world's  work  is  done  through  the  dynamic 
of  these  combined  principles.  It  leads  to  the  "assumption"  of 
the  persistence  and  satisfying  quality  of  the  object.  In  the  pre- 
logical  mode  we  found  the  attitude  of  assumption  "to  be  the  use 
of  a  meaning  in  a  control  and  with  a  reference  that  is  not  yet  estab- 
lished, not  yet  a  'presumption.'"  In  this  mode — the  quasi- 
logical — there  is  not  only  present  "pre-logical  assumption,"  but 
logical  as  well,  as  existence  or  "reality"  meaning.^ 

Sympathy:  In  sympathy  consciousness  identifies  with  itself 
the  experiences  of  others,  The  mere  fact  of  living  in  the  psy- 
chical atmosphere  of  social  intercourse  will  produce  sympathy. 
Consciousness  apprehends  the  feelings  of  others  and  reproduces 
them  in  itself,  at  the  same  time  forgetting  self  and  remembering 
that  they  are  the  feelings  of  others.*    Sympathy  is  not  faith, 

>  See  Hoffding,  Outlines  of  Psy.,  pp.  235-256. 

^  See  Dewey,  Psy.,  353. 

^See  Baldwin,  Thought  and  Things,  Vol.  II,  pp.  11-12. 

•Ibid.,  pp.  329-330. 


18  The  Faith  Consciousness 

but  as  between  men  it  is  a  strong  bond  of  union  and  readily 
becomes  the  occasion  for  the  exercise  of  it.  Often  men  have  faith 
in  each  other  and  in  their  schemes  and  inventions  purely  out  of 
personal  sympathy  for  each  other.  The  faith  of  sympathy  is  a 
practical  force  of  far-reaching  influence. 

Desire :  While  desire  is  not  impulse  it  is  often  a  development 
from  it.  Impulse  has  no  presentation  of  the  end  to  which  it  goes 
straight  and  blindly.  But  desire  has.^  An  impulsive  act  repeat- 
edly performed  resulting  in  a  pleasurable  state  of  consciousness 
creates  a  desire  for  the  repetition  of  the  same  or  similar  experience. 
This  implies  a  consciousness  that  is  able  to  project  itself  into  the 
future  and  to  apprehend  the  difference  between  a  future  or  pos- 
sible state  of  consciousness  and  its  actual  experience.  It  is  a 
consciousness  that  knows  it  has  impulses,  and  as  a  form  of  pleas- 
urable action  sets  before  itself  the  satisfaction  of  them.  The 
tendency  to  realize  desires  often  results  in  the  taking  of  great 
risks  and  in  pressing  into  service  the  function  of  faith  for  no  other 
reason  than  that  of  personal  gratification.  The  faith  of  impulse, 
sympathy,  desire,  implies  a  consciousness  the  content  of  which 
involves  a  play  back  and  forth  as  between  rational  determination 
on  the  one  hand,  and  a  blind  undiscriminating  outgoing  of  spirit 
on  the  other.  This  quality  of  consciousness  may  be  character- 
ized as  quasi-logical,  i.e.,  partly  deliberate  and  rational,  but  at 
the  same  time  undetermined  in  part  and  rationally  blind  in  its 
ongoing  and  purpose.  Such  a  principle  may  be  called  quasi- 
logical  faith  or  assumption.  It  "assumes"  beyond  what  it  is 
entitled  either  to  ''presume"  or  "believe." 

'  See  Dewey,  Psy.,  p.  360. 


CHAPTER  III. 

RATIONAL   OR   LOGICAL  FAITH :    PRESUPPOSITION  AND  BELIEF. 

Another  form  of  the  faith  principle  found  in  the  over-lapping 
spheres  of  conscious  content  is  rational  faith.  Faith  may  be  said 
to  be  rational  when  it  rests  upon  the  deductions  of  reason  or 
involves  a  process  of  judgment.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  a 
faith  that  trusts  everything  and  everyone,  taking  on  an  attitude 
of  presumption.  In  this  consciousness  loses  itself  in  its  object. 
All  logical  considerations  are  either  not  present  or  are  set  aside 
under  the  stress  of  a  passion  which  finds  satisfaction  only  in 
burying  itself  in  the  object  of  its  pursuit.  This  kind  of  faith  is 
found  not  only  in  the  pre-logical  state  of  consciousness  where  the 
logical  function  has  not  yet  appeared,  but  often  also  in  mature 
consciousness  where  the  capacity  for  reflection  is  possible  but  is 
not  exercised  or  controlled.  We  have  seen  pre-logical  faith  pass 
into  that  state  of  conscious  progression  where  consciousness  in 
the  process  of  becoming  comes  to  be  more  and  more  capable  of 
self-determination,  with  view  to  ends,  but  not  altogether  so. 
This  we  call  the  quasi-logical  state  of  the  faith-consciousness. 
It  "assumes"  what  it  cannot  "presume."  From  this  the  pas- 
sage is  made  more  or  less  laboriously  into  the  logical  mode.  We 
say  "laboriously"  because  the  popular  and  easy  road  is  that  of 
the  quasi-logical  mode,  although  the  way  is  open  for  the  use  of 
the  judgment.  Consciousness  in  passing  from  the  pre-logical 
to  the  quasi-logical  mode  undergoes  a  change  not  merely  in 
expansion  but  in  the  germination  of  a  new  function,  namely, 
the  judgment;  whereas  the  passage  from  the  quasi-logical  to  the 
logical  state  of  consciousness  involves  the  addition  of  nothing 
wholly  new  but  rather  the  development  of  what  already  is  germi- 
nally  there.  So  that  the  difference  between  quasi-logical  and 
logical  faith  resolves  itself  into  the  question  of  the  quantity  of 
rational  determination  absent  or  present  in  any  one  conscious- 


20  The  Faith  Consciousness 

ness.    In  approaching  the  question  of  rational  faith  certain  funda- 
mental considerations  are  involved. 

There  is  a  faith  the  ground  of  which  is  not  rationally  deter- 
mined and  yet  is  probably  possessed  only  by  a  rational  conscious- 
ness. It  is  the  faith,  consciousness  has  in  itself.  No  reasoning 
is  necessary  to  induce  consciousness  to  have  faith  in  itself  and 
yet  only  a  reflecting  consciousness  is  capable  of  selecting  out  and 
setting  up  that  fact  as  part  of  its  content  or  meaning.  There  is  a 
faith  also  in  self-consciousness  that  needs  not  the  support  of 
rational  determination.  Self-consciousness  is  self-knowledge 
not  indeed  without  reflection,  but  as  the  presupposition  of  the 
mode  of  reflection.  Self-knowledge  is  a  kind  of  knowledge  of  the 
self  that  simply  wells  up  within  one  without  having  to  pass 
through  the  categories  of  thought.  It  is  the  consciousness  of  the 
inner  control  and  direction  of  thought.  Another  kind  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  self  is  that  which  comes  through  reflection.^  It 
objectifies  the  self  and  makes  it  content  of  judgment.  The  faith 
or  presupposition  here  involved  is  of  the  type  of  presumption  as 
it  is  developed  in  the  mode  of  reflection.  It  requires,  however, 
a  reflective  consciousness  to  see  that  an  act  of  faith  is  involved. 
This  shows  that  the  subject-self  is  presupposed  just  by  the  act 
of  judgment  that  aflSrms  the  object-self.  The  same  is  true  of 
our  knowledge  of  persons  and  the  world.  Reflection  shows  clearly 
that  our  knowledge  of  a  person  is  purely  and  only  a  mental  con- 
struct.^ How  then  do  we  know  that  the  subject-person  and  the 
mental  construct  or  object-person  correspond?  And  yet  we  do 
not  hesitate  a  moment,  but  act  at  once  on  the  faith  that  they 
do  seeing  that  one  is  the  function  that  constitutes  the  other. 
The  same  holds  true  when  the  principle  is  applied  to  the  world. 
Every  mind  constructs  for  itself  its  own  world.  The  world  that 
is  phenomenally  real,  to  us  is  a  mental  construct.  But  we  believe 
that  there  is  also  an  actually  real  world  and  that  there  is  some 
kind  of  correspondence  between  the  two.^  The  real  world  is 
presupposed  by  judgment  as  a  control  sphere  just  as  the  subject 

'  See  Baldwin,  Handbook,  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  144. 

'  See  Bowne,  Theory  of  Thought  and  Knowledge,  pp.  309-310. 

'  See  Bowne,  Metaphysics,  pp.  16-17. 


Logical  Faith:  Presupposition  and  Belief  21 

is.  We  never  think,  however,  of  making  this  distinction  in 
practical  hfe,  and,  therefore,  the  faith-process  involved  is  never 
recognized.  Consciousness  must  be  reflective  in  order  to  see 
the  process  while  the  faith  involved  is  spontaneous. 

What  is  "presumed"  in  the  pre-logical  and  "assumed"  in  the 
quasi-logical  is  presupposed  in  the  logical.  The  case  is  some- 
thing different,  however,  when  we  come  to  contemplate  the  Abso- 
lute. The  difference  is  in  this:  The  mind  is  compelled  to  con- 
struct the  world  because  it  lives  in  it,  on  the  basis  of  fact  and 
truth  but  the  Absolute  we  are  not  compelled  to  construct  under 
like  limitations.  It  is  an  ideal  construction  making  "postula- 
tion"  beyond  experience.  It  requires  an  act  of  faith  to  believe 
that  there  is  a  correspondence  between  the  Infinite  and  the  men- 
tal concept.  It  is  evident  again  that  this  is  the  same  kind  of 
faith  as  that  called  "trust"  above. 

By  rational  faith  is  meant  that  whenever  faith  is  used  we  always 
have  an  adequate  reason  for  its  use.  The  reason  for  faith  may 
not  always  be  in  consciousness  when  faith  is  employed.  A  mem- 
ory of  the  same  may  suffice  many  times,  but  rational  faith  must 
have  somewhere  in  consciousness  a  basis  in  judgment.  Illus- 
trations of  rationally  determined  faith  are  all  about  us  in  life. 
A  person  has  faith  in  another  because  he  "knows"  him.  We 
have  faith  in  the  system  because  we  have  tested  it  and  "know" 
it.  The  man  of  science  has  faith  that  his  theory  will  hold  even 
where  he  cannot  experiment,  because  it  seems  reasonable,  and 
held  good  where  experimentation  was  possible.  The  chief  motive 
of  philosophy  is  its  absolute  faith  in  the  unity  of  the  whole,  and 
that  somewhere  in  the  universe  there  is  light,  and  that  at  the 
center  everything  is  transparently  clear  to  reason.  From  the 
first  philosophy  has  been  looking  for  plan  and  purpose  in  things 
with  the  faith  that  the  universe  is  not  destitute  of  them,  and  for 
good  reasons. 

Another  term  for  rationally  determined  faith  is  belief.  An 
interesting  study  is  that  of  the  distinction  between  knowledge 
and  belief.  But  this  we  pass  over  at  this  time.  Our  aim  here 
is  simply  to  show  that  there  is  what  we  are  calling  the  rational 
or  logical  mode  of  the  faith-consciousness  in  which  the  whole 
believed  implicates  our  "presuppositions"  of  belief. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


IDEAL  faith:  postulation. 


The  ideal  element  in  perception  and  memory  attaches  to  the 
meaning  of  the  perceived  or  remembered  thing.  It  is  tied  down 
to  some  particular  existence  and  cannot  be  freed  until  the  mode 
of  construction  known  as  creative  imagination  lifts  the  ideal 
element  from  its  connection  and  treats  it  with  reference  to  its 
own  significance  and  value,  disregarding  the  concrete  existence 
of  the  thing.  Creative  imagination  liberates  the  idea  from  its 
accidental  connections  and  as  a  universalizing  activity  reveals 
it  in  its  nature  as  independent  of  varying  concomitants. 

While  the  idealizing  activity  of  imagination  is  involved  in  con- 
scious construction  ideals  as  such  are  not  constructions,  as  they 
are  not  describable.  Ideal  productions,  as  vague  ends  set  up 
for  pursuit,  are  elements  of  meaning  attaching  to  present  images. 
They  are  of  the  nature  of  interest.  They  have  the  distinguish- 
ing characters  of  the  good,  the  beautiful  and  the  true;  to  the 
religious  ideal  there  attaches,  in  addition,  the  moral  or  ethical 
determinations  inducing  the  sense  of  obligation  and  dependence. 
The  psychic  disposition  to  pursue  identities  through  the  con- 
nections of  new  determinations  results  in  the  setting  up  of  the 
abstraction  by  which  conception  proceeds.  The  realization  of 
the  pursuit  of  identities  involved,  gives  rise  to  a  feeling  of  appre- 
ciation whenever  desperate  elements  of  experience  "  fall  together 
in  a  unity  of  common  meaning."^  The  unifying  process  accom- 
panied by  appreciation  or  gratification  is  necessary  in  order  to 
abstraction.  One  of  the  elements  of  conceptual  feeling,  therefore, 
attaching  to  abstraction  "may  be  best  characterized  as  the  feel- 
ing of  unity  in  a  whole.  "^ 

>  Baldwin,  Handbook  of  Psy.,  Feeling  and  WiU,  p.  200. 
» Ibid. 


Ideal  Faith:  Postulation  23 

Through  the  process  of  abstraction  the  concept  is  set  up  as  a 
positive  construction,  at  the  expense  and  neglect,  however,  of 
all  experience  ineligible  for  illustration.  In  generalization  we 
have  an  opposite  but  equally  important  aspect  of  conception. 
Consciousness  modifies  conceptual  content  in  extending  its 
application  to  cover  its  accepted  conscious  experience.  General- 
ization is  a  psychic  process  toward  variety  tending  away  from 
identity.  The  gratification  of  these  tendencies  from  identity  to 
variety  results  in  a  conceptual  feeling  which  may  be  characterized 
as  that  of  the  harmony  of  parts. 

The  conscious  value  of  a  concept  in  experience  yields  an  aspect 
of  feeling  begotten  of  intension,  as  over  against  extension,  "which 
excites  only  a  feeling  of  its  present  accidental  application."^ 
The  emotion  aroused  by  the  process  of  intension  is  the  "feeling 
formeaning. " 

Ideals  have  attached  to  them  a  kind  of  objectivity  which  may 
be  called  presentative  as  present  in  imagination;  and  also  the 
same  reality-coefficient  attaching  to  every  one,  as  not  present 
in  imagination.  These  aspects  of  conceptional  emotion  may  be 
characterized  as  the  feeling  of  universality. 

Taking  the  four  ingredients  of  conceptual  feeling  sketched 
above.  Ideals  may  be  defined,  "as  the  forms  which  we  feel  our 
conceptions  would  take  if  we  were  able  to  realize  in  them  a  satis- 
fying degree  of  unity,  harmony,  significance  and  universality."^ 

The  conceptual  feeling  involved  in  ideal  construction  carries 
with  it  a  determination  which  has  the  force  of  belief — a  deter- 
mination which  may  be  characterized  as  Ideal  Faith. 

Consciousness  in  the  ideal-faith  mode  goes  beyond  the  content 
of  reflection  in  an  acceptance,  on  the  basis  of  "trust,"  of  the 
remote,  when  it  is  not  fully  guaranteed  by  thought.  This  out- 
come results  from  the  growth  of  ideal  and  universal  meaning. 
The  attitude  of  consciousness  involved  is  postulation ;  it  is  related 
to  presupposition  as  assumption  is  to  presumption.     In  assump- 

1  Ibid. 

2  Baldwin,  Handbook  of  Psy.,  pp.  201-202,  also  Thought  and  Things,  Vol. 
I,  pp.  234-238  on  Ideal  Meaning,  and  Vol.  II,  on  Postulation,  etc.,  as 
presented  below. 


24  The  Faith  Consciousness 

tion  consciousness  determines  a  construction  of  which  the  main 
element  of  meaning  is  that  it  has  not  been  found  real  but  is  set 
up,  accepted  and  acted  upon  as  though  it  were  real.  Meaning 
is  ejected  into  a  control  sphere  in  which  there  is  little  or  no  reality- 
correspondence  ;  it  is  made  to  attach  to  the  construction — by  the 
ipse  dixit  of  consciousness — when  in  fact  it  is  out  of  its  proper 
realm.  Relations  of  coordination  and  interconnection  as  attach- 
ing to  the  meaning  are  forced  into  the  situation  to  satisfy  the 
conscious  impulse  of  the  moment.  The  principle  of  assumption 
may  be  illustrated  by  the  child  and  his  toy-dog:  "When  the 
child  goes  through  the  process  of  feeding  his  toy-dog,  he  '  assumes' 
a  sphere  that  he  does  not  regularly  '  presume.' "  In  presumption 
consciousness  acts  upon  the  principle  that  reality  is  what  the 
meaning  indicates,  and  reads  into  reality  only  such  meaning  as 
the  pre-determined  meaning  of  reality  will  justify.  "That 
attitude  whereby  the  meaning  is  recognized  as  determined  for 
what  it  is,  gives  what  we  may  call  a  'presumption'  of  existence, 
control,  or  reality.  The  meaning  is  depended  upon  or  expected 
to  have  its  own  appropriate  coefficients,  its  own  'real'  value; 
but  the  aspect  that  constitutes  it  thus  'real'  is  not  isolated  or 
asserted,  as  a  separate  element  of  meaning.  When  a  child,  for 
example,  cries  for  an  object  in  the  next  room,  he  'presumes'  its 
existence  and  availability  in  the  world  of  his  practical  interests. " 

W^e  have  said  that  postulation  is  related  to  presupposition  in 
the  logical  mode  as  assumption  is  to  presumption  in  the  pre- 
logical.  Postulation  is  a  schematic  meaning  in  the  logical  mode. 
Reality  treated  in  a  schematic  way  may  be  said  to  be  postulated ; 
the  postulated  meaning  thus  set  up  is  a  logical  assumption.  Pre- 
supposition on  the  other  hand  is  an  attitude  of  logical  presump- 
tion or  acceptance.  "  It  is  that  determinate  sphere  of  reference 
and  control  which  attaches  to  the  whole  disjunctive  meaning. 
It  is  the  sphere  which  is  accepted  and  acknowledged  as  that  in 
which  the  disjunction  stated  in  the  subject-matter  is  finally  to 
be  resolved." 

In  determining  the  content  of  ideal  faith  the  material  is  sub- 
sumed under  the  form  of  postulation.  The  various  ideals — 
truth,  goodness,  "ideas  of  reason" — are  thought  as  developments 


V  OF  THE 


Ideal  Faith:  Postulation  25 

in  the  form  of  postulation  of  assumptive  or  schematic  meaning. 
We  shall  see  in  the  schematic  rendering  necessary  for  the  pro- 
duction of  the  "agreement  of  relations"  we  call  truth  that  the 
principle  of  postulation  performs  an  important  role.  The  deter- 
mination of  truth  as  an  element  in  the  content  of  ideal  faith 
necessitates  the  consideration  of  other  principles. 

The  fundamental  question  of  speculation  is :  What  is  reality? 
Psychologically  considered  the  question  would  be:  What  is 
meant  by  the  ''sense"  of  reality?  Ideas  to  which  reality  is 
attributed  and  those  to  which  it  is  not,  have  the  effect  in  conscious- 
ness of  producing  respectively  the  feeling  of  reality,  and  the 
feeling  of  unreality.  Reality-feeling  at  the  earliest  stage  of 
conscious  development  is  simply  ''feeling" — feehng  without 
meaning  of  any  kind.  "Consciousness  is  filled  with  affective 
sensational  happenings."  Reality-feeling,  however,  is  not  be- 
lief. There  is  a  distinction  between  the  feeling  of  reality  and 
belief.  "The  phrase  reality-feeling  denotes  the  fundamental 
modification  of  consciousness  which  attaches  to  the  presentative 
side  of  sensational  states — ^the  feeling  which  means,  as  the  child 
afterwards  learns,  that  an  object  is  really  there.  By  the  word 
belief,  on  the  other  hand,  we  may  denote  the  feeling  which 
attaches  to  what  may  be  a  secondary  or  representative  state  of 
mind,  and  indicates  the  amount  of  assurance  we  have  at  the  time 
that  an  object  is  there.  The  idea  which  has  the  reality-feeling 
may  be  said  to  have  its  own  guarantee  of  its  reality;  it  is  a  given, 
and  my  feeling  of  it  is  direct  acquaintance  with  it.  But  the  idea 
to  which  belief  attaches  is  guaranteed  by  some  other  mental 
state,  by  what  I  know  about  it,  or  by  its  connection  with  ideas 
already  guaranteed."^ 

Unreality-feeling  takes  its  rise  in  an  experience  quite  different 
from  the  feeling  of  reality.  Impulse  and  appetite  rise  in  conscious- 
ness as  simply  feeling  but  make  sharp  demands  upon  the  sensi- 
bility. Presence-feeling — as  in  taste  and  touch — is  readily  con- 
nected with  the  feeling  of  absence,  as  when  the  stimulus  is  with- 
drawn.    The  mere  feeling  of  the  absence  of  that  which  is  neces- 

^  Baldwin,  Handbook,  Feeling  and  Will,  p.  149. 


26  The  Faith  Consciousness 

sary  to  satisfy  makes  the  impression  upon  consciousness  of 
unreality.  Unreality-feeling,  however,  is  not  the  "negation  of 
belief;"  it  does  not  rise  as  the  contradiction  of  reality.  It  is  not 
the  result  of  conflict,  but  takes  its  rise  in  natural  impulse.  There 
are  degrees  of  unreality — as  well  of  reality-feeling.  The  reality 
feeling  attaching  to  food  is  more  intense  in  time  of  hunger  than 
of  complete  satisfaction.  Every  consciousness  postulates  for 
itself  realities  of  varying  degree.  The  postulation  of  the  true  as 
the  real  and  eternal  as  over  against  that  which  is  unreal  and 
temporal  has  an  abiding  significance  for  consciousness.  Such 
a  reality — ideal  reahty — readily  becomes  the  object  of  faith.  A 
reality  corresponding  to  truth  may  be  thought  in  the  schematic 
meaning  of  this  mode  as  an  assumptive  postulate  of  the  faith- 
consciousness.  Not  to  go  into  the  various  processes  by  which 
truth  thus  considered  is  finally  determined,  it  will  suffice  to  pre- 
sent the  outcome,  by  way  of  definition,  of  the  development  of  the 
principle.  "Truth  is  a  relative  conversion  of  the  contents  of 
social  acceptance  into  the  facts  of  a  system  of  external  controls. 
Socially  considered  truth  has  an  existential  reference  that  is  not 
removed  by  the  statements  of  social  desiderata."^  Again,  "the 
true  is  simply  the  body  of  knowledge,  acknowledged  as  belonging 
where  it  does  in  a  consistently  controlled  context.  The  char- 
acters of  truth  are  those  attaching  to  the  content  of  judgment  as 
being  under  mediate  control.  The  meaning  of  truth  is  its  intent 
to  mediate  the  original  sphere  of  existence  meaning  in  which  it 
arose. "^  "Truth  is  a  system  of  objective  contents  set  up  and 
acknowledged  as  under  a  variety  of  coefficients  of  control;  this 
system  is  socially  derived  and  socially  valid,  though  rendered  by 
acts  of  individual  judgment;  the  whole  movement  issues  in  a 
dualism  of  self-acknowledging  and  objects-acknowledged,  a 
dualism  from  which  thought  as  such  cannot  free  itself."' 
Truth  as  thus  defined  when  once  set  up  and  acknowledged  as 
such  readilypasses  into  an  abiding  postulate  of  a  reality  accepted 
by  faith. 

1  Baldwin,  On  Truth,  Psy.  Rev.,  July,  1907,  p.  283. 

^Ibid.,  p.  287. 

'  Ibid.,  Note  2,  p.  287. 


Ideal  Faith:  Postulation  27 

Goodness  as  an  ideal  construction  gets  its  determination  also 
through  the  postulation  of  the  faith-consciousness.  The  ideal 
of  consciousness,  that,  somehow,  at  the  heart  of  things  there 
must  be,  not  only  truth,  but  goodness  as  well,  is  a  postulate  of 
faith  upon  which  consciousness  acts  with  a  high  degree  of  cer- 
tainty. There  is  no  rest  in  the  thought  that  everything  is  bad; 
so  that  consciousness  in  lieu  of  discovering  the  good,  postulates, 
as  a  working  ideal,  goodness  at  the  center  of  things,  and  has  the 
faith  that  all  things  rest  upon  goodness  as  ultimate  ground. 

Other  ideal  constructions  which  may  be  thought  as  postulates 
of  the  faith-consciousness  are  what  Kant  calls  the  "ideas  of  rea- 
son"— "the  ego,  considered  merely  as  a  thinking  nature  or  soul; 
the  conception  of  the  Universe;  and  the  one  and  all-sufficient 
cause  of  all  cosmological  series,  in  other  words,  the  idea  of  God."^ 

"The  notion  of  self,  hke  all  other  notions,  is  a  gradual  growth."^ 
We  defer,  however,  the  consideration  of  the  development  of  the 
self  as  content,  but  enquire  concerning  the  status  of  the  control- 
self  as  an  assumptive  postulate  of  the  faith-consciousness.  The 
notion  of  the  self  as  content  is  constructed  upon  the  basis  of 
empirical  data,  while  that  of  the  control-self  is  an  ideal  construc- 
tion existentially  postulated  as  the  "subject-agent"  or  "inner 
control"  of  consciousness  giving  direction  and  organization  to 
experience.  Kant  says  concerning  the  control-self  that  it  is, 
"the  rational  conception  or  idea  of  a  simple  substance  which  is 
in  itself  unchangeable,  possessing  personal  identity,  and  in  con- 
nection with  other  real  things  external  to  it."  "But,  "he  says, 
"the  real  aim  of  reason  in  this  procedure  is  the  attainment  of 
principles  of  systematic  unity  for  the  explanation  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  soul.  That  is,  reason  desires  to  be  able  to  represent  all 
the  determinations  of  the  internal  sense,  as  existing  in  one  sub- 
ject, all  powers  as  deduced  from  one  fundamental  power,  all 
changes  as  mere  varieties  in  the  condition  of  a  being  which  is 
permanent  and  always  the  same,  and  all  phenomena  in  space 
as  entirely  different    in  their  nature   from   the  procedure  of 


'  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  pp.  417-420. 

'  Baldwin,  Handbook,  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  143. 


28  The  Faith  Consciousness 

thought."*  And  he  would  have  us  understand  that  the  best 
way  to  meet  this  demand  of  reason  is  by  "  means  of  such  a  schema, 
which  requires  to  regard  this  ideal  thing  (control-self)  as  an  actual 
existence."  But,  "the  psychological  idea  is  meaningless  and  in- 
applicable, "  he  says,  "except  as  the  schema  of  a  regulative  con- 
ception. "^  That  is,  the  control-self,  whatever  else  it  may  be,  is 
an  ideal  postulate  of  consciousness  determined  in  the  interest  of 
unity  as  a  regulative  principle  of  reason — schematic,  therefore — 
yet  a  principle  in  which  consciousness  may  have  practical  faith. 

Another  idea  of  reason  is  the  conception  of  the  Universe. 
For  Kant,  ''nature  is  properly  the  only  object  presented  to  us, 
in  regard  to  which  reason  requires  regulative  principles.  "^  But 
nature  is  two-fold — ''thinking  and  corporeal  nature."  This 
two-foldness  of  nature  compels  consciousness  to  postulate 
"nature  in  general. "  "The  absolute  totality  of  the  series  of  these 
conditions  is  an  idea,  which  can  never  be  fully  realized  in  the  em- 
pirical exercise  of  reason,  while  it  is  serviceable  as  a  rule  for  the 
procedure  of  reason  in  relation  to  that  totality.  "*  But  the  notion 
is  an  ideal  construction,  regulative,  schematic,  not  constructive 
but  postulated  as  a  practical  necessity  in  the  interests  of  ration- 
ality and  unity,  and  worthy  of  the  trust  and  confidence  of  the 
faith-consciousness. 

The  last  idea  of  reason  that  need  be  mentioned  is  "the  all- 
sufficient  cause  of  all  cosmological  series,  the  idea  of  God." 
Consciousness  in  its  contemplation  of  nature  and  the  universe 
constructs  an  ideal  to  satisfy  the  demand  for  an  all-sufficient 
cause  of  things.  Kant  recognizing  the  urgency  for  such  a  con- 
struction says,  "The  highest  formal  unity,  which  is  based  upon 
ideas  alone,  is  the  unity  of  all  things — a  unity  in  accordance 
with  an  aim  or  purpose;  and  the  speculative  interest  of  reason 
renders  it  necessary  to  regard  all  order  in  the  world,  as  if  it  origi- 
nated from  the  intention  and  design  of  a  supreme  reason.  This 
principle  unfolds  to  the  view  of  reason,  in  the  sphere  of  experi- 

*  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  418. 
=^Ibid.,  p.  418. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  419. 
Mbid.,  p.  419. 


Ideal  Faith:  Postulation  29 

ence,  new  and  enlarged  prospects,  and  invites  it  to  connect  the 
phenomena  of  the  world  according  to  teleological  laws,  and  in  this 
way  to  attain  to  the  highest  possible  degree  of  systematic  unity. 
The  hypothesis  of  a  supreme  intelligence,  as  the  sole  cause  of  the 
universe — an  intelligence  which  has  for  us  no  more  than  an  ideal 
existence,  is  accordingly  always  of  the  greatest  service  to  reason."* 

The  ideal  thus  constructed,  however,  is  a  postulate  of  faith 
both  schematic  and  regulative.  The  progressive  meaning  ejected 
into  the  ideal  of  the  Absolute  on  the  part  of  consciousness  in  its 
effort  to  adequately  satisfy  the  demand  of  its  developing  need 
is  considered  under  the  second  determination  of  the  faith-con- 
sciousness, namely.  Religious  Faith. 

Other  elements  of  the  content  of  ideal  faith  have  yet  to  be 
recognized,  namely,  the  postulation  of  the  absolute  as  the  ideal 
of  both  truth  and  appreciation ;  the  postulation  of  absolute  experi- 
ence and  its  justification;  and  the  postulation  of  the  absolute- 
self  or  God. 

Consciousness  is  never  content  to  rest  in  a  dualism.  The 
dualistic  notion,  for  example,  of  an  eternal  universe  as  over  against 
an  eternal  God  presents  an  embarrassment  to  consciousness; 
consciousness  seeks  to  bridge  the  dualism  in  a  fundamental 
unity.  The  history  of  conscious  development  is  that  of  a  pro- 
gression by  way  of  dualistic  stages  toward  the  absoluteness  of 
conscious  experience.  In  connection  with  the  postulation  of  the 
absolute  as  the  ideal  of  truth  and  appreciation  certain  dualistic 
experiences  demand  consideration. 

Consciousness  in  the  logical  mode  sets  up  as  a  dualistic  con- 
struction to  be  acknowledged  and  judged  the  control-self  as  over 
against  the  empirical-self.  The  embarrassment  of  conscious- 
ness thus  formed  by  the  presence  of  a  dualism  is  soon  disolved 
in  the  transition  of  experience  from  the  logical  to  the  feeling  or 
appreciative  consciousness.  So  soon  as  consciousness  takes  up 
the  terms  of  the  dualism  in  an  experience  of  feeling  and  apprecia- 
tion the  dualism  disolves,  and  a  unity  of  selfhood  is  formed. 
That  is,  for  the  purposes  of  thought,  the  control-self  and  the 

*  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  420. 


30  The  Faith  Consciousness 

empirical-self  may  be  set  over  against  each  other;  but  all  the 
while — or  whenever  it  attends  to  it — consciousness  has  the  feel- 
ing that  these  selves  are  nothing  more  than  itself  functioning  now 
in  this  way  and  now  in  that.  It  is,  however,  in  feeling  only  that 
the  duahsm  is  transcended;  as  soon  as  the  logical  consciousness 
is  invoked  the  dualistic  embarrassment  reappears. 

Another  form  of  dualistic  experience  is  the  situation  necessi- 
tated by  consciousness  in  getting  knowledge  of  the  world  of 
objects.  The  world  of  objects  appears  in  consciousness  as  con- 
tent over  against  which  consciousness  sets  itself  as  control  giving 
direction  and  organization  to  it  as  experience.  The  organization 
thus  formed  in  experience  is  truth;  and  the  dualistic  experi- 
ence set  up  is  that  of  the  logical  determination  of  conscious- 
ness over  against  the  world  of  truth.  That  is,  a  dualism  is  formed 
within  the  logical  consciousness.  To  rest  here  would  bring 
thought  to  a  standstill.  All  progression  of  consciousness  would 
stop.  Somehow  the  higher  dualism  thus  formed  must  be  trans- 
cended. Again  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  must  be  found  in  an 
appeal  to  appreciation — the  aesthetic  and  feeling  consciousness. 
Consciousness  in  this  mode  in  addition  to  getting  the  meaning 
of  the  object,  becomes  so  overwhelmingly  absorbed  in  that 
meaning — the  absorption  taking  the  form  of  appreciation — as 
to  loose  itself  in  it  and  to  neglect  altogether  the  fact  of  its  exist- 
ence as  object  as  over  against  consciousness  as  subject.  In  other 
words,  the  dualism  is  transcended  by  a  supreme  abandonment 
of  consciousness  to  the  meaning  of  its  content  in  an  all  absorb- 
ing act  of  appreciation.  Everything  that  would  tend  to  distract, 
all  relativity  and  determinations  of  every  kind  are  neglected 
absolutely  in  the  interest  and  the  moment  of  conscious  aesthetic 
appreciation.  That  is  a  great  triumph  for  consciousness.  No 
longer  is  it  the  victim  of  dualistic  embarrassment.  It  has  worked 
its  way  through  the  dualism  of  all  preceding  modes  and  now  is 
able  to  gather  up  in  the  unity  of  appreciation  all  present  as  well 
as  past  experiences. 

Consciousness  in  constructing  for  itself  the  meaning  of  the 
absolute  ejects  into  it  the  meaning  of  its  own  experience;  so 
that  both  truth  and  appreciation  are  thought  as  attaching  to 


Ideal  Faith:  Postulation  31 

the  meaning  of  the  absolute  as  the  ideal  of  worship.  The  abso- 
lute is  able  to  set  up  and  think  as  object  the  truth — herein  logical 
— as  over  against  itself;  but  unconditioned  by  it,  it  is  able  also  to 
transcend  the  dualism  formed  by  itself  and  the  truth  in  an  abso- 
lute experience  of  aesthetic  appreciation.  So  that  consciousness 
is  not  only  itself  able  to  transcend  all  dualisms  in  this  experience 
but  postulates  the  absolute  as  having  the  power  to  unite  all 
things  in  a  supreme  act  of  absolute  appreciation.  The  construc- 
tion thus  postulated  we  shall  find  in  the  determination  of  religious 
faith  to  be  the  absolute-self  or  God,  and  as  such  the  preeminent 
postulate  of  ideal  faith. 


CHAPTER  V. 


MYSTIC   AND   HYPER-LOGICAL   FAITH. 


MYSTIC  faith:    contemplation. 

Jacobi's  theory  of  the  rational  intuitions  of  God,  and  all  such 
determinations,  are  highly  mystic  and  contemplative.  The 
truly  mystic  consciousness  as  "religious  fact"  consists  in  "a. 
tendency  to  arrive  at  the  consciousness  of  the  Absolute  by  means 
of  symbols  under  the  influence  of  love."^  Bouchette  affirms, 
as  something  less  than  the  religious  fact,  that,  "mysticism  con- 
sists in  according  to  spontaneity  a  larger  place  in  the  intelligence 
than  is  granted  to  the  other  faculties.  "^  Victor  Cousin  without 
a  true  appreciation  of  the  religious  fact  speaks  of  mysticism  as 
"the  claim  of  knowing  God  without  intermediary,  and,  as  it  were 
face  to  face;  in  mysticism,  everything  that  comes  between  God 
and  ourselves  hides  him  from  us.  "^  But  Rec^jac  emphasizing  the 
religious  fact  of  mysticism  considers  this  the  best  definition: 
"Mysticism  is  the  tendency  to  draw  near  to  the  Absolute  in  moral 
union  by  symbolic  means."* 

The  method  of  mysticism  is  symbolism,  mysticism  in  its  con- 
templation of  the  Absolute  is  highly  symbolic.  The  mystic 
consciousness  constructs  its  objects  as  symbols.  The  relation 
between  symbolic  representation  and  the  things  represented  is 
that  of  analogy.  Analogy  is  the  "unique  force  which  renders 
fertile  the  vast  field  of  mysticism."^    Science  and  philosophy  are 

*  R^c^jac,  The  Basis  of  the  Mystic  Knowledge,  p.  62. 
^  Bouchette,  Diet,  des  sciences  philosophiques,  p.  189. 
'  Hist,  de  la  philos  moderne,  t,  ii,  IX,  le,  con. 

*  R^c^jac,  The  Basis  of  the  Mystic  Knowledge,  p.  64. 
•'Ibid.,  p.  120. 


Mystic  Faith:  Contemplation  33 

much  concerned  with  symboHc  representation  through  analogy. 
SymboHsm  is  the  only  expression  proper  to  mysticism.  The 
function  of  the  symbolic  object  is  not  so  much  to  image  or  rep- 
resent as  to  suggest.  The  symbolic  object  has  about  itself  a  halo 
of  sentiment  which  stimulates  consciousness  as  suggestion  to  an 
emotional  outbreak — joyful,  sympathetic  or  otherwise.  R6c6jac 
says,  "symbolic  signs  have  the  same  effect  as  direct  perceptions; 
as  soon  as  they  have  been  'seen'  within,  their  psychic  action 
takes  hold  of  the  feehng  and  fills  consciousness  with  a  crowd  of 
images  and  emotions  which  are  attracted  by  the  force  of 
Analogy."^ 

Mystic  representation  is  purely  subjective  as  indicated  by  the 
nature  of  mystic  phenomena — voices,  prophetic  dreams,  ecstasy, 
etc.  The  "inner  voice"  of  the  mystic  consciousness  results 
from  the  unity  of  God  and  spirit  in  a  relation  shut  in  from  all 
sense-reaction  or  objective  determination.  In  dreams,  the 
external  perceptions  of  the  waking  state  are  absent  and  memory 
and  imagination  must  reproduce  them  in  order  to  give  to  con- 
sciousness the  sense  of  at  least  apparent  externality.  In  ecstasy, 
empirical  determinations  cease  to  influence  consciousness;  the 
sense  of  externality  entirely  disappears  and  consciousness  be- 
comes wholly  absorbed  in  the  divine  presence.  In  all  these 
phenomena  the  moral  element  is  present  in  varying  degree  and 
attaches  to  the  sense  of  freedom  as  the  constant  quality  of  con- 
sciousness. The  elements  thus  described  are  the  dominant  deter- 
minations of  the  mystic  faith-consciousness.  The  principle  of 
surrender  as  in  all  preceding  modes  is  here  the  functioning 
process  of  mystic  faith,  and  contemplation  is  a  form  of  the 
content  of  the  mystic  consciousness. 

Other  elements  of  the  mystic-faith  content  need  to  be  con- 
sidered: for  instance,  the  faith  of  feeling  only,  in  opposition  to 
knowledge ;  faith  as  will — the  will  to  believe — without  knowledge ; 
faith  as  the  faculty  of  the  intuition  of  the  ideal;  and  faith  as  union 
of  all  in  the  content  of  a  new  immediateness; — the  aesthetic 
consciousness. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  134. 


34  The  Faith  Consciousness 

Faith  as  feeling  takes  the  form,  first  of  all,  of  desire.  This  is 
a  state  in  which  aspiration  plays  an  important  role.  Conscious- 
ness aspires  toward  an  object,  a  good,  such  as  the  heart  requires, 
but  the  mind  does  not  construct.  Desire  though  vague  in  its 
object  becomes  a  deep  passion  of  the  heart  which  finds  satisfac- 
tion only  in  the  grasp  of  faith  upon  the  infinite,  eternal,  the  per- 
fect. In  ecstasy  also  we  have  a  form  of  faith  as  feeling.  The 
consciousness  of  ecstasy  is  the  consciousness  of  unity  with  the 
object  of  faith;  there  is  no  intermediary;  consciousness  sees, 
touches,  possesses,  is  merged  in  its  object.  This  is  not  simply 
the  faith  that  believes  without  seeing,  it  is  the  faith  that  believes 
by  touching,  possessing,  feeling.  Consciousness  in  ecstasy  does 
not  hold  its  object  through  idea — i.e.,  through  knowledge — but 
through  feehng;  through  a  perfect  unity  of  consciousness  and 
object  in  feeling;  and  that  feeling  is  faith.  Faith  unites  without 
absorbing;  it  merges  consciousness  in  its  object,  and  at  the 
same  time  increases  the  self-consciousness  of  each. 

Mystic  experience  is  not  knowledge  but  results  from  the  faith 
of  feeling  which  has  in  it  the  mystic  element.  Mysticism  is 
not  an  expedient  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  rational  conscious- 
ness in  its  reach  after  the  unknowable.  All  that  it  takes  from 
the  empirical  consciousness  is  the  form  of  its  expression — the 
symbolic  method  or  elements.  Science  as  knowledge — that  which 
grasps  its  objects  through  ideas — and  mysticism  never  meet. 
While  mysticism  seeks  a  synthesis  of  the  self  and  the  world,  it 
does  it  through  the  grasp  of  consciousness  functioning  in  the 
act  of  faith  characterized  by  feeling,  and  not  through  the  under- 
standing. Knowledge  as  that  which  synthesizes  through  ideas  can 
never  truly  grasp  first  principles;  it  must  be  left  to  the ''heart" 
alone  to  do  this,  and  that  through  feeling.  The  mystic  con- 
sciousness does  not  need,  however,  to  disregard  knowledge 
through  ideas;  the  fact  is  that  by  virtue  of  its  free  and  naive 
feeling  of  the  absolute,  it  is  the  better  able  when  occasion  offers 
to  synthesize  experience  through  the  understanding. 

IWe  come  now  to  the  determination  of  another  element  in  the 
,   content  of  mystic  faith,  namely,  faith  as  will — the  will  to  believe — 
V    without  knowledge.    There  is  a  sense  in  which  it  is  not  true  that 


Mystic  Faith:  Contemplation  35 

we  can  believe  what  we  will,  and  there  is  a  sense  in  which  it  is 
true,  that  we  can  will  to  believe.  When  belief  is  defined  "as  the 
consciousness  of  the  personal  indorsement  of  reality — reality  being 
found  to  be  a  general  term  for  that  kind  of  experience  which 
satisfies  one  or  more  of  the  needs  of  the  individual — it  is  evident 
that  belief  is  not  the  feeling  of  volition  or  effort. "  "  It  is  a  feeling 
of  willingness  or  consent,  but  not  of  will.  We  often  consent  to 
reality  against  our  wills.  The  effect  of  will  upon  belief  is  really 
the  effect  of  voluntary  attention  upon  one  or  more  of  the  coeffi- 
cients already  mentioned.  Attention  may  intensify  an  image  and 
so  give  greater  sensational  or  emotional  reality.  It  may  also 
dwell  upon  and  bring  out  certain  relational  connections  of  an 
image  and  so  throw  the  logical  coefficient  on  the  side  of  those 
connections ;  it  may  refuse  to  dwell  upon  those  relations  which  are 
distasteful.  But  it  is  not  true  that  we  can  believe  what  we  will. 
To  say  we  believe  what  we  need,  is  not  to  say  we  believe  what  we 
want."* 

On  the  other  hand  belief  used  in  the  sense  of  mystic  faith — 
i.e.,  knowledge  without  recourse  to  ideas — maybe  said  to  be  willed 
when  by  an  act  of  determination  consciousness  seeks  to  merge 
itself  in  the  absolute ;  the  result  of  such  an  act  being  the  grasp  of 
consciousness  in  its  effort  to  touch  and  possess  the  absolute 
in  the  synthesis  of  feeling.  Mystic  faith,  that  is,  the  conscious- 
ness that  seeks  to  merge  itself  thus  does  what  it  does  as  deter- 
mined by  the  will.  So  that  in  a  very  general  sense,  in  this  mode 
we  may  say  that  the  dynamic  of  consciousness  is  the  will  to 
believe — i.e.,  the  will  to  exercise  mystic  faith,  the  will  that  deter- 
mines the  mystic  faith  consciousness  to  do  what  it  does.  While 
the  mystic  consciousness  can  hardly  be  said  to  decide  an  option 
between  propositions  in  its  effort  to  possess  the  absolute  yet  it 
is  true  that  the  same  dynamic  of  volition  determines  its  action  as 
when  consciousness  is  required  to  decide  an  option.  In  both 
cases  it  is  the  will  to  believe.  Where  the  option  is  present  the 
principle  may  be  set  forth  as  follows:  "Our  passional  nature 
not  only  lawfully  may,  but  must,  decide  an  option  between  prop- 

*  Baldwin,  Handbook,  Feeling  and  Will,  pp.  170-171. 


36  The  Faith  Consciousness 

ositions,  whenever  it  is  a  genuine  option  that  cannot  by  its 
nature  be  decided  on  intellectual  grounds;  for  to  say,  under  such 
circumstances,  'Do  not  decide,  but  leave  the  question  open,'  is 
itself  a  passional  decision — just  like  deciding  yes  or  no — and  is 
attended  with  the  same  risk  of  losing  the  truth."*  The  thesis 
thus  stated  involves  the  will  to  believe  as  in  mystic  faith. 

Another  element  of  the  content  of  mystic  faith  is  faith  con- 
sidered as  the  faculty  of  intuition  of  the  ideal.  "Mystic  intui- 
tion enables  us  to  perceive  the  facts  of  freedom  through  and 
above  the  empirical  consciousness,  in  a  manner  the  inverse  of 
abstraction.  "2  Imagination  serves  the  mystic  consciousness  in 
its  production  of  symbols  and  reason  exercises  the  intuition  suited 
to  it.  Before  rational  determination  of  any  kind  can  take  place 
there  must  be  the  presentation  to  consciousness  of  mental  images 
— images  formed  under  the  pressure  of  moral  influence — which 
constitute  the  symbols  of  the  meaning  underlying  the  analogical 
representations.  Reason  exercises  intuition  proper  to  the  sym- 
bols thus  presented.  Reason  in  abstracting  from  the  symbols, 
however,  produces  that  which  must  not  be  thought  as  in  any 
way  corresponding  to  objective,  empirical  knowledge.  The 
product  is  that  of  the  nature  of  analogy.  The  mystic  purpose  of 
reason  in  analogy  is  to  merge  the  Absolute  in  consciousness  and 
consciousness  in  the  Absolute.  The  culmination  of  symbolic 
representation  is  the  Absolute  in  consciousness  as  an  abiding 
moral  presence.  That  presence  together  with  the  efforts  of  the 
mystic  consciousness  in  realizing  its  purpose  stimulates  inward 
action,  strengthens  the  will,  quickens  the  moral  sense  and  rein- 
forces the  natural  powers  in  the  making  of  character. 

The  faculty  of  mystic  intuition  by  which  the  Absolute  is  posited 
in  consciousness  is  conditioned  by  the  moral  qualities  of  the  sub- 
ject. Only  a  quickened  moral  consciousness  would  seek  to  merge 
itself  in  the  Absolute;  and  the  Absolute  could  only  be  posited 
where  such  moral  qualities  exist.  Desire  also  as  an  internal  driv- 
ing passion  may  be  said  to  condition  mystic  intuition.    Where 


'  James,  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  11. 

^  R6c6jac,  The  Basis  of  the  Mystic  Knowledge,  p.  137. 


Mystic  Faith:  Contemplation  37 

there  is  little  desire  for  the  Absolute,  little  effort  will  be  put  forth 
in  the  realization  of  that  desire.  But  desire  intensified  into  a 
passion  will  have  a  decided  conditioning  and  directing  influence 
upon  intuition.  An  all-absorbing  desire  stimulates  mystic  intui- 
tion to  a  transcendental  reach  in  the  two-fold  effort  to  merge 
consciousness  in  the  Absolute  and  to  posit  the  Absolute  in  con- 
sciousness. Mystic  intuition  is  instrumental  as  the  faculty  of 
faith  in  the  realization  of  the  Absolute  as  its  Ideal. 

Faith  as  the  union  of  all  in  the  content  of  a  new  immediateness 
— the  aesthetic — is  a  further  determination  of  the  experience  which 
is  hyper-logical  rather  than  mystic.  The  process  by  which  the 
aesthetic  object  is  taken  out  of  its  relations  and  set  up  for  contem- 
plation is  called  "detachment."  There  are  two  methods  of 
detachment;  one  where  the  object  is,  as  we  say,  taken  up  out  of 
its  setting  and  treated  or  individuated  as  in  itself  worthy  of 
aesthetic  appreciation;  the  other  is  where  consciousness  deliber- 
ately detaches  the  object  from  it  relations  and  connections — 
often  in  an  abrupt  and  broken  way — and  sets  it  up  for  idealiza- 
tion and  contemplation  without  further  reference  to  its  contex- 
tual setting.  Consciousness  in  its  attitude  toward  the  aesthetic 
object  may  be  treated  from  two  points  of  view;  (1)  that  of  the 
spectator,  and  (2)  that  of  the  artist  himself.  The  consciousness 
of  the  spectator  may  be  characterized  in  two  ways:  (1)  there  is 
the  sense  of  reading  into  (einfiihlung)  the  object  elements  of 
personification — consciousness  gives  to  the  object  life,  thought, 
feeling,  consciousness  itself  or  whatever  is  necessary  to  animate 
it;  and  (2)  the  sense  of  oneness  (absorption  in)  with  the  object — 
consciousness  feels  itself  as  one  with  the  object — as  actually 
doing  the  things  which  before  it  personified  the  object  as  doing; 
consciousness  is  absorbed,  merged  in  the  object — is  at  one  with 
it.  In  this  we  see  the  bridging  of  the  dualism  of  the  self  and  its 
object,  and  a  perfect  unity  established.  The  consciousness  of  the 
artist  may  be  said  to  have  these  elements  of  aesthetic  experience 
in  common  with  that  of  the  spectator,  but  in  addition,  something 
more,  namely,  the  feeling  of  appreciation  which  comes  from  the 
sense  of  ha\nng  actually  produced  that  which  gives  so  much  real 
aesthetic  pleasure.     In  mystic  contemplation  consciousness  pro- 


38  The  Faith  Consciousness 

ceeds  in  a  quasi-aesthetic  wa}''  and  merges  itself  by  faith  into  unity 
with  its  object  of  love  and  worship. 


II 


HYPER-LOGICAL     FAITH:      THE     HYPER-LOGICAL     EXPERIENCE     AS 
UNION  OF  FAITH  AND  KNOWLEDGE. 

The  early  type  of  conscious  experience  may  be  characterized 
as  an  immediacy  of  feeling;  consciousness  at  this  stage  is  in  the 
pre-logical  mode;  the  power  of  logical  or  rational  determination 
has  not  yet  developed.  Memory,  imagination,  the  conscious- 
ness of  self,  the  power  to  construct  objects  of  thought,  to  objec- 
tify and  apprehend  the  world,  the  dualisms  of  "inner-outer," 
"mind  and  body,"  "self  and  not-self,"  the  power  of  rationality, 
of  contemplation, — none  of  these  have  yet  arisen,  and  conscious- 
ness knows  not  itself  or  its  environment;  it  simply  is,  and  lives 
in  an  immediacy  of  mere  feeling.  Prof.  James  has  character- 
ized this  earliest  stage  of  consciousness  as  "pure  experience," 
"Pure  experience,"  he  says,  "is  the  name  which  I  give  to  the 
original  flux  of  life  before  reflection  has  categorized  it.  Only 
new-born  babes,  and  persons  in  semicoma  from  sleep,  drugs, 
illness  or  blows  can  have  an  experience  pure  in  the  literal  sense 
of  a  that  which  is  not  yet  any  definite  what,  though  ready  to  be 
all  sorts  of  whats;  full  both  of  oneness  and  of  manyness,  but  in 
respects  that  don't  appear;  changing  throughout,  yet  so  con- 
fusedly that  its  phases  interpenetrate,  and  no  points,  either  of 
distinction  or  of  identity,  can  be  caught.  True  experience  in 
this  state  is  but  another  name  for  feeling  or  sensation.  But  the 
flux  of  it  no  sooner  comes  than  it  tends  to  fill  itself  with  emphases, 
and  these  to  become  identified  and  fixed  and  abstracted;  so  that 
experience  now  flows  as  if  shot  through  with  adjectives  and 
names  and  prepositions  and  conjunctions.  Its  purity  is  only  a 
relative  term,  meaning  the  proportional  amount  of  sensation 
which  it  still  embodies. 

"  Far  back  as  we  go,  the  flux,  both  as  a  whole  and  in  its  parts, 
is  that  of  things  conjunct  and  separated.     The  great  continua 


Hyper-Logical  Faith:  Faith  and  Knowledge  39 

of  time,  space  and  the  self  envelopes  everything  betwixt  them  and 
flow  together  without  interfering.  The  things  that  they  envel- 
ope come  as  separate  in  some  ways  and  as  continuous  in  other. 
Some  sensations  coalesce  with  some  ideas,  and  others  are  irrecon- 
cilable. Qualities  compenetrate  one  space,  or  exclude  each  other 
from  it.  They  cling  together  persistently  in  groups  that  move 
as  units,  or  else  they  separate.  Their  changes  are  abrupt  or 
discontinuous;  and  their  kinds  resemble  or  differ;  and,  as  they 
do  so,  fall  into  either  even  or  irregular  series. 

"In  all  this  the  continuities  and  the  discontinuities  are  abso- 
lutely coordinate  matters  of  immediate  feeling.  The  conjunc- 
tions are  as  primordial  elements  of  'fact'  as  are  the  distinctions 
and  disjunctions.  In  the  same  act  by  which  I  feel  that  this 
passing  minute  is  a  new  pulse  of  my  life,  I  feel  that  the  old  life 
continues  into  it,  and  the  feeling  of  continuance  in  no  wise  jars 
upon  the  simultaneous  feeling  of  a  novelty.  They,  too,  com- 
penetrate harmoniously.  Prepositions,  copulas,  and  conjunc- 
tions, 'is',  'isn't,'  'then,'  'before,'  'in,'  'on,'  'beside,'  'between,' 
'next,'  'hke, '  'unlike,'  'as,'  'but,'  flower  out  of  the  stream  of 
pure  existence,  the  stream  of  concretes  or  the  sensational  stream, 
as  naturally  as  nouns  and  adjectives  do,  and  they  melt  into  it 
again  as  fluidly  when  we  apply  them  to  the  new  portion  of  the 
stream."*  Thus  we  see  that  consciousness  begins  its  life  with, 
and  in,  an  immediacy  of  feeling. 

But  with  the  development  of  consciousness  in  experience  there 
soon  spring  up  the  various  powers  mentioned  above — memory, 
imagination,  the  "inner-outer"  and  "mind  and  body"  dualisms, 
consciousness  of  self,  objectivity,  knowledge,  rationality — so  that 
we  are  able  to  track  out  with  some  degree  of  certainty  the  vari- 
ous progressions  or  strands  of  consciousness,  as  well  as  the  modes 
through  which  consciousness  must  pass  in  its  developing  move- 
ment. It  is  to  be  noted  that  consciousness  through  experience 
very  soon  gets  out  of  its  first  immediacy  of  mere  feeling  and  passes 
into  the  world  of  "dualisms,"  which,  as  development  continues 


'  James,  Journal  of  Phil.,  etc.,  Jan.  19,  1905,  p.  29.     See  Baldwin,  Thought 
and  Things,  I,  p.  45. 


40  The  Faith  Consciousness 

become  more  and  more  hardened  into  constructions  of  greater 
and  greater  practical  utility.  The  history  of  the  ''dualisms," 
and  consequent  embarrassments  of  consciousness  in  its  various 
progressions,  and  the  study  of  the  development  of  consciousness 
in  its  manifoldness  is  the  work  of  Genetic  Logic/  this,  however,  we 
shall  not  attempt  here;  we  wish  merely  to  point  out  the  fact  that 
consciousness  begins  with  an  immediacy  of  feeling  but  soon 
passes  out  of  it  into  the  ''mediateness"  of  thought,  in  which 
sphere  it  meets  \\dth  the  embarrassment  of  dualisms.  Now  the 
question  is.  Does  consciousness  ever  come  to  the  place  in  its 
development  where  the  possibility  of  dissolving  or  bridging  all 
dualisms  is  reached?  The  answer  is  that  we  beUeve  it  does,  and 
that  that  stage  is  the  mode  we  are  calling  the  "hyper-logical" — 
an  experience  constituted  by  the  union  of  faith  and  knowledge. 

Very  early  in  consciousness  there  begins  to  appear  in  a  quite 
germinal  way  a  strand  or  progression  which  has  in  it  the  promise 
of  a  higher  and  richer  immediacy;  we  refer  to  that  which  appears 
first  as  mere  play,  uninformed,  impulsive  and  uninfected  by 
thought  or  rationality.  Later  this  progression  takes  the  form 
of  "semblance"  and  we  see  the  beginning  of  art;  with  this  the 
idealistic  and  aesthetic-consciousness  emerge.  In  the  aesthetic 
experience  the  dualisms  through  which  consciousness  has  passed 
and  in  which  it  may  at  the  time  find  itself  are  bridged.^ 

The  full  aesthetic  experience  is  not  possible  in  the  pre-logical 
modes;  this  becomes  the  more  evident  as  we  seek  to  determine 
the  marks  or  criteria  of  the  logical  consciousness.  "It  is  plain 
that  the  criterion  of  the  logical  as  such  is  found  not  alone  in  the 
matter  thought  about,  but  in  the  way  we  think  about  it ;  not  alone 
in  the  factors  determining  the  "what"  of  which  the  object  is 
made,  but  in  the  factors  of  control  which  give  answer  to  the 
question  "how"  it  is  made.  Looked  at  broadly,  the  mode  is  one 
of  a  dualism  of  self  and  the  objects  of  its  experience;  logical 
objects,  are  therefore,  only  those  objects  which  are  meanings  to 
a  subject  of  experience.     Again,  logical  objects  are  those  which 

'  See  Prof.  Baldwin's  work,   Thought  and  Things,   which  the    following 
exposition  follows.  Use  also  is  made  of  his  unpublished  lectures  on  Aesthetics. 
-  For  the  aesthetic  experience  see  Section  I,  this  chapter. 


Hyper-Logical  Faith:  Faith  and  Knowledge  41 

issue  from  the  redistribution  and  organization  of  all  simpler 
meanings  in  a  whole  context  of  experience.  They  are  individ- 
uated as  in  this  organization;  as  related,  in  meanings  of  general, 
universal,  particular  and  singular  force.  Here,  evidently,  the 
the  characteristic  mark  is  the  elevation  of  relationship — actual 
presence  of  contemporaneous,  like,  different  and  otherwise  re- 
lated wholes — into  a  single  whole  exhibiting  these  relations. 
Relation  is  individuated  as  a  meaning  or  object  of  thought,  one 
whose  abstraction  from  the  body  of  the  former  objective  con- 
tinuum or  complication,  it  is  the  special  interest  of  this  mode 
to  achieve.  Finally,  the  logical  function  is  that  in  which  these 
two  specifications  are  given — a  subject  of  experience,  and  a 
related  objective  whole  which  is  experience  to  such  a  subject. 
This  function  is  that  to  which  we  have  given  the  name  judgment. 
Judgment  is  the  psychic  control,  issuing  from  what  is  now  a  self, 
exercised  upon  those  meanings  of  relation  which  constitute 
ideas  about  things."^ 

It  would  seem  from  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  constitute  an 
object,  an  object  for  the  logical  consciousness,  that  the  aesthetic 
experience  is  impossible  to  the  pre-logical  consciousness.  In 
fact  we  have  just  seen  that  the  immediacy  of  consciousness  in 
the  beginning — in  the  pre-logical  mode — is  the  immediacy  of 
mere  feeling,  and  is  not  aesthetic.  The  aesthetic  experience  would 
seem  to  be  a  provision  for  immediacy  at  the  top  rather  than  at 
the  bottom.  Consciousness  must  first  develop  its  dualisms  and 
pass  through  them  before  the  parallel  lines  of  progression  and 
development,  as  object  or  meaning  on  the  one  hand  and  con- 
sciousness on  the  other,  can  be  brought  together  in  a  higher  and 
richer  immediacy — "higher"  because  it  rests  upon  the  founda- 
tion of  dualistic  and  logical  experience,  and  ''richer"  because  out 
of  this  same  experience  it  is  highly  informed. 

While  the  aesthetic  experience  is  above  the  logical — is  hyper- 
logical — at  the  same  time  consciousness  profits  by  having  passed 
through  the  logical;  and  the  gain  is  manifest  in  the  enriching  of 
the  aesthetic  experience.     At  every  stage  in  conscious  progres- 

»  Baldwin,  Thought  and  Things,  Vol.  I,  p.  271. 


42  The  Faith  Consciousness 

sion  the  aesthetic  experience  partakes  by  way  of  enrichment  of 
the  aggregate  of  past  experience  up  to  that  point.  A  meagerly 
developed  and  uninformed  consciousness  will  not  have  as  rich 
an  aesthetic  experience  as  the  highly  developed  and  well  informed 
consciousness  will  have.  Thus  we  see  the  justification  for  calling 
this  the  ^'hyper-logical  experience;"  it  is  not  an  experience  for 
the  logical  consciousness  as  such,  but  is  an  experience  for  a  con- 
sciousness which  has  been  greatly  enriched  by  the  logical. 

In  the  hyper-logical  experience  so  described  we  have  a  union 
of  faith  and  knowledge — meaning  by  faith  a  certain  dispositional 
attitude  of  consciousness,  an  openness  of  consciousness  toward 
experience ;  and  by  knowledge  experience  itself.  In  the  aesthetic 
experience  the  object — already  experienced  and,  therefore, 
knowledge — and  the  open  consciousness — faith,  dispositional 
and  volitional — are  brought  together  and  merged  into  one.  So 
that  the  mode  of  consciousness  in  which  the  aesthetic  experience 
arises  may  be  called  from  the  point  of  view  of  this  thesis.  Hyper- 
logical  Faith. 

In  concluding  the  constructive  portion  of  Part  I,  Non-Religious 
Faith,  let  us  notice  a  few  points  by  way  of  summing  up.  We  have 
found  throughout  the  progressions  of  the  faith-consciousness  that 
the  faith  principle  consists  fundamentally  in  surrender  to  an 
absent  object,  postulated  in  the  higher  modes  as  ideal.  Faith 
we  have  defined  as  "trust,"  confidence — trust  that  reaches 
beyond  rational  grounds  in  its  effort  to  grasp  its  object.  Belief 
as  a  "personal  endorsement  of  reality,"  or  "as  the  consciousness 
of  the  presence  of  a  thing  as  fitted  to  satisfy  a  need,"  does  not 
involve  the  faith  principle.  The  need  for  faith  may  disappear 
and  belief  take  its  place,  but  faith  cannot  be  said  prior  to  this  to 
be  belief.  The  faith-consciousness  does  not  begin  with  reality 
or  give  it  a  "  personal  endorsement "  as  present,  but  rather  postu- 
lates an  ideal  which  it  hopes  is  real  but  has  no  way  of  proving;  but 
in  the  absence  of  proof  it  "trusts"  in  it  as  real  and  "surrenders" 
to  it.  Later  the  ideal  of  faith  comes  to  be  thought  and  believed 
in  as  real.  Faith  then  may  be  said  to  give  it  a  kind  of  imagina- 
tive reality.  Conviction  as  to  such  a  reality  would  involve  the 
elements  of  the  belief-consciousness.      The  faith-consciousness 


Hyper-Logical  Faith:  Faith  and  Knowledge  43 

in  constructing  its  ideal  sets  before  itself  an  end  for  the  will  and 
thus  influences  it  in  surrender.  In  this  faith  embodies  the  will; 
on  the  other  hand  it  may  be  said  that  will  is  directed  by  faith, 
as  when  it  becomes  the  dynamic  of  consciousness  in  its  effort  to 
merge  itself  in  its  object.  Farther  it  may  be  said  that  faith 
involves  the  emotional  and  dispositional  attitudes  of  the  self. 


Part  II 
RELIGIOUS  FA.ITH 

APPENDIX  I 

AN  ABSTRACT   OF  PART  II 

Part  II  of  the  Dissertation^  is  a  treatment  of  Religious  Faith; 
while  Part  III  deals  with  the  Use  of  the  Faith  Principle  in  Modern 
Philosophy,  with  special  reference  to  Kant,  Fichte,  Jacobi,  Paul- 
sen, James  and  Royce,  closing  with  a  chapter  on  Criticism  and 
Conclusion. 

Part  II  is  an  attempt  to  sketch  in  a  genetic  way  the  movement 
of  the  religious  faith-consciousness  through  its  various  modes  or 
progressions.  Chapter  I  is  a  study  of  the  Genesis  of  the  Religious 
Faith-Consciousness  in  The  Sensuous-Self  Mode.  Chapter  II  is  a 
treatment  of  The  Supersensuous-Self  Mode  as  Rational  or  Deistic. 
Chapter  III  is  a  study  of  the  Immanence-Self  Mode;  and  Chapter 
IV  of  The  Spiritual-Self  Mode. 

By  way  of  summing  up,  the  following  concluding  passage  of 
Part  II,  may  be  taken  as  briefly  setting  forth  the  determinations 
of  religious  faith  throughout  the  four  stages  of  conscious  develop- 
ment: In  the  Sensuous-Self  Mode  consciousness  may  be  thought  of 
as  having  the  attitude  of  presumption  of  nature — the  sense  of 
mere  reality-feeling  in  nature's  presence.  The  meaning  of  this 
mode  is  largely  sensational  and  anthropomorphic.  In  the  Super- 
sensuous-Self Mode  consciousness  has  the  power  of  detachment 
or  subjectivity,  it  rests  its  determinations  upon  rational  proof; 
in  this  we  have  a  return  to  acceptance  or  belief  without  trust; 
faith  is  grounded  in  dogma.  In  the  Immanence-Self  Mode  con- 
sciousness constitutes  its  constructions  by  postulating  ideal  worth 

'  A  bound  manuscript  copy  of  the  entire  Dissertation  is  on  file  at  the 
Johns  Hopkins  University.  It  is  hoped  that  a  full  treatment  of  Religious 
Paith  may  be  published  in  the  near  future. 


Appendix  45 

beyond  logical  proof.  It  assumes  an  Ideal-Self  for  worship,  and 
trusts  that  which  it  cannot  guarantee  by  belief.  In  the  Spiritual- 
Self  Mode  the  Ideal-Self  construction  is  highly  universalized  and 
personalized  as  within  immediate  reach  of  consciousness.  The 
process  of  its  construction  is  that  of  postulation  beyond  the 
guarantee  of  proof.  Throughout  the  entire  movement  of  conscious 
progression  we  find  the  dominant  quality  or  attitude  of  the  faith- 
consciousness  to  be  that  of  "  surrender. "  In  the  higher  religious 
modes  we  find  the  surrender  of  faith  to  involve  the  postulation 
of  meaning  by  trust  beyond  that  guaranteed  by  belief.  In  the 
postulate  of  spiritual  or  mystic  faith  which  is  contemplative  and 
aesthetic  we  have  the  unity  of  both  trust  and  belief.  The  result- 
ing character  of  consciousness  is  that  of  immediateness,  oneness 
of  appreciation  and  feeling  with  the  Spirit-Self.  The  Spirit — or 
Absolute — Self  is  thought  or  postulated  as  Absolute  Ideal-Self, 
as  Absolute-Consciousness  merged  in  the  object  of  its  creation — 
including  finite  selves — through  the  unifying  principles  of  love, 
feeling,  appreciation.  The  Absolute  Experience,  by  which  all 
dualisms  are  bridged,  is  primarily  aesthetic. 

In  our  study  of  the  faith-consciousness  throughout  its  progres- 
sion, it  has  been  gratifying  to  find  such  a  rich  and  important  field 
for  thought  and  investigation.  In  our  genetic  treatment  of  the 
subject  we  have  been  dealing — though  only  in  an  introductory  way 
— with  a  very  vital  phase  of  conscious  function  and  content.  We 
shall  find  in  a  large  treatment  of  "Genetic  Faith"  that  all  philoso- 
phy may  be  subsumed  under  the  head  of  the  "function  and 
content  of  the  faith-consciousness;"  at  least  we  shall  find  that  all 
philosophy  must  be  more  or  less  mystic,  and  that  every  philosophy 
should  have  a  place  in  its  system  for  faith. 


LIFE. 

William  Wilberforce  Costin  was  born  in  Bale  Verte,  N.  B., 
Canada,  December  19,  1871.  His  preliminary  education  was 
received  in  the  public  schools  of  his  county,  and  the  Collegiate 
School  of  Fredericton,  N.  B.  After  spending  two  years  at  Mount 
Allison  Male  Academy  he  matriculated  at  Mount  Allison  College, 
Sackville,  N.  B.,  in  1891,  where  he  was  graduated  with  the  degree 
of  B.  A.  in  1895. 

The  years  1895-06  and  1897-08,  he  spent  in  study  at  Boston 
University  School  of  Theology.  The  year  1896-07,  he  was  pastor 
of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  in  County  Line,  N.  Y.  In 
the  spring  of  1898  he  began  his  ministry  in  Maryland,  and  in 
1900  was  received  on  trial  in  the  Baltimore  Annual  Conference 
of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church.  In  1902  he  was  ordained  a 
Deacon,  and  in  1904,  an  Elder. 

In  the  fall  of  1900  while  pastor  of  the  Woodside  Methodist 
Episcopal  Church,  Md.,  he  began  graduate  study  in  the  Colum- 
bian (now  George  Washington)  University,  Washington,  D.  C, 
where  he  was  graduated  with  the  degree  of  M.A.  in  1901.  Dur- 
ing the  year  1902-03  he  pursued  graduate  study  at  the  same 
University.  The  year  1903-04,  he  spent  doing  special  work  in 
the  Oriental  Seminary  of  Johns  Hopkins  University. 

In  the  fall  of  1904,  he  began  graduate  study  at  the  Johns  Hop- 
kins University,  chosing  Philosophy  as  his  principal  and  Experi- 
mental Psychology  and  History  of  the  Ancient  East  as  his  sub- 
ordinate subjects. 

His  ministry  in  Maryland  has  comprised  the  following  pastor- 
ates: Patapsco  Circuit  1898-99,  Leonardtown  1899-1900, 
Woodside,  1900-01,  Boundary  Ave.  1901-02,  Hunt's  1902-05 
City  Station:  Firsi  Church,  Assistant  Pastor,  1905-06,  Oxford 
1906-08,  and  Chester  Street  1908. 

He  has  attended  the  lectures  of  Professor  Paul  Haupt  and  Dr. 
Foote,  in  special  studies,  and  of  Professors  J.M.Baldwin,  Stratton, 


Life  47 

Johnston,  Griffin,  and  Doctors  Ladd-Franklin,  Farrar,  Baird 
and  Riley,  in  graduate  work,  to  all  of  whom  he  would  express 
grateful  appreciation,  especially  to  Professor  James  Mark  Bald- 
win for  the  inspiration  of  his  instruction,  personality,  advice  and 
encouragement. 


CALIFQ 


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